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How to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member 
with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with 
the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before. This is the fundamental 
problem to which the social contract holds the solution  
Jean Jacques Rousseau1 
   
 
Introduction 
Though what is euphemistically termed ‘the Kashmir problem’ has stalked political life in 
India since the advent of independence in 1947, it was really in 1988 that the issue acquired 
serious proportions. For in that year we were to witness a popular uprising in the valley 
against the Government of India and for independence, or azadi. Prior to 1988, Jammu and 
Kashmir constituted the linchpin of tensions between India and Pakistan. But it is of some 
interest to note that Pakistan’s forays into the region in 1947 and 1965 brought forth scant 
support from the people of the valley. The popular upsurge in the valley of Kashmir in 1998, 
however, cast serious reflections on the state of India’s democracy in general and the record 
of democracy in the state in particular. The uprising subsided within four years, but it opened 
the gates for the entry of extremist elements into the valley, and as recent events have shown, 
into the rest of the country.   
 
I argue in this paper that the main reason for political discontent and resort to violence in 
Kashmir has to do with repeated infringement of the social contract by the central government 
of India, acting often in tandem with the state government. This has been accompanied by the 
insistent erosion of the democratic space that permits articulation of political discontent. In 
effect, in Kashmir not only did the state violate the social contract, democratic institutions and 
organisations failed to channel political restiveness. Dissatisfied groups had therefore little 
option but to resort to the use of violence; and since violence not only breeds its own 
trajectories but is self-reinforcing, conflict in the Kashmir valley took on a life of its own.   
 
It is true that other parts of India have also undergone massive discontent. For instance, a 
movement for secession appeared in Tamil Nadu in the early 1960s, following the attempt to 
impose Hindi as a national language upon non-Hindi speakers.  Bihar and Gujarat erupted in a 
major social movement under the leadership of J. P. Narayan in the early 1970s to protest 
against the authoritarianism of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. But these conflicts pale before 
the scale of violence that was seen in Kashmir in the late 1980s, as well as in the Punjab and 
the North East. 
 
Although many have lain the blame for the intensity of the violence on the ethnic factor, I 
trace the politicisation of identity to processes that are internal to democracy and federalism in 
India. I argue that the strong sense of ethnic identity that has been forged and propelled into 
the public sphere in the valley is the outcome of sheer bad faith on the part of the Indian 
                                                
1 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p.60. 
 state.2 Arguably, ethnic identities are constructed in and through a series, or a combination of, 
political processes. But however constructed ethnic identities may be, once they have been 
constituted, in often inflexible and antagonistic modes, they lend a rather sharp edge to the 
weapon of political discontent. Further, once ethnic identities have been catapulted into the 
public realm as political strategy they prove, as history has shown, not only inflammatory, 
they also outstrip all efforts to contain them. An analysis of the way in which political 
discontent has sharpened ethnic identities and vice versa is woven through the discussion 
below. In short, I argue that despite the fact that much ink has been spilt on exploring the 
ethnic dimension of politics in the valley, and though more than a little academic energy has 
been expended on the ‘Pakistan’ factor, the roots of the Kashmir problem lie in processes that 
are internal to democracy and federalism in India. Quite what these processes are forms the 
substance of this paper. 
 
The paper builds on a survey conducted in the district of Srinagar, which is classified as a 
high conflict area. We used three indicators to identify high conflict districts:3 murders, 
kidnappings and riots. This choice was corroborated by our finding that the incidence of 
murders, kidnappings and riots went up phenomenally during the phase of the conflict. On the 
basis of these three criteria we identified Anantnag, Baramula, and Srinagar districts in 
Kashmir as high conflict districts. For security reasons we were unable to conduct a survey in 
Anantnag and Baramula, therefore we choose Srinagar district. Through consultation with the 
district commissioner, police officers in the thanas of the district, academics, activists, and 
journalists, we identified the villages that have been most affected or not affected at all by the 
conflict. These were categorised as High Conflict Areas (HCA) and Low Conflict Areas 
(LCA). We interviewed a minimum of 150 respondents in each of these categories. 
 
The paper is laid out in four parts. First, I discuss the theoretical debates concerning 
nationalism and ethnicity and ideas about the social contract. The second section is historical 
inasmuch as I focus on the controversy that surrounded the signing of the original contract in 
Kashmir. In the third part I investigate the manner in which the social contract has been 
infringed over time. The argument in this section is organised around some of the preliminary 
findings of a survey conducted in Kashmir. In the final section I draw out the implications of 
this analysis for theories of ethnic conflict.4 
 
 
Addressing a Debate about Ethnic Conflict and Self-determination 
Despite all claims to the contrary we still seem to live in an era of nation states. Therefore it is 
not surprising that the rise of ethno-nationalist movements that seek to reorder state 
boundaries sends political theorists and policy planners alike into a tizzy.5 Though some 
                                                
2 Jammu and Kashmir (J and K) border a neighbour, Pakistan, which rocked by its own political instability has 
repeatedly fished in troubled waters for various reasons. While I do not take up this issue more than tangentially, 
I believe that far too much has been laid at the doors of Pakistan and the Islamic brand of ‘terrorism’ that it is 
said to export. 
3 These indicators are drawn from various reports Crime in India, published by the National Crime Records 
Bureau, Home Ministry, Government of India. 
4 I do not examine in detail the course of violence in the state, and the role of the diaspora in fomenting conflict 
in this essay, not because these are not constitutive of militancy, but for reasons of space. Therefore, even as I 
take cognisance of these constitutive factors, I leave a detailed discussion on them for another time and another 
paper. 
5 For an excellent review of literature on the theme, see Ian S. Lustick, et al., ‘Secessionism in Multicultural 
States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?’, American Political Science Review, 98:2 (May 2004), 
pp.209-229.  
 scholars have normatively defended the right of ethno-nationalist groups to a ‘state of their 
own’,6 on the whole the scholarly community is opposed to secession.  Take Allen 
Buchanan’s argument: though Buchanan accepts that the right to secede is a moral right, he 
concludes that the normative principle of self-determination of groups ought to be abandoned 
since the costs of even wanting to implement the right are prohibitive.7 Scholars have 
legislated objections to the right of self-determination on various moral, legal, and practical 
grounds. Let me deal with just two of these.  
 
For one, secession in the name of the self-determination of a people begs the question of who 
exactly these people are: whether an intangible entity called the ‘people’ does not contain 
significant minorities that do not subscribe to the goal of secession.  There are other disturbing 
considerations that need to be taken into account, for instance that any ‘disputed’ territory is 
likely to be inhabited by a plurality of groups, each of which think of the world in ways that 
are different to the manner in which the group demanding secession does so. As Schofield 
suggests in the context of the Kashmir problem, there is no collective will for secession 
among the heterogeneous inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir (J and K).8  
 
This recognition may have some bearing on our understanding of ethnic conflict. Ethnic 
conflict, it is generally agreed, is about the terms on which a group seeks to redefine its own 
territorial boundaries at the expense of the larger territorial unit of which it has till then 
formed a part. What we need to recognise is that internal minorities within the group that 
demands a ‘state of its own’, as well as other ethnic groups within the territory, are also 
parties to the conflict inasmuch as their interests are affected both by the conflict and by the 
outcome.9 What about the rights of these groups/minorities to determine their own future? No 
self-respecting democrat can afford to overlook this aspect: not these days when minority 
rights have been fore-grounded in much of the literature on democracy.10  
 
But this would mean that ethnic conflict is not only about one group, which united by a sense 
of political grievance confronts the state through the use of violence; it is also about the ways 
in which the leaders of the group seek to monopolise power in a given territory. To put it 
differently, ethnic conflict is basically about who will have control of power in a defined area 
through the employment of violence, not only against the state, but also against dissenting 
groups.  
 
Therefore the proposition that every ethnic group should have a ‘state of its own’ on demand 
may not prove a sensible option. For the partition of a territory into two or more sovereign 
units has seldom resolved the issue of minority rights within the ‘new’ state. Consider the case 
of Pakistan: within a short span of twenty-four years after the formation of the state, erstwhile 
                                                
6 Lustick et al. (2004), p.209. 
7 Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce: From Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991. Self-determination is not a right to which all people or ethnic or 
cultural groups have simply by virtue of being distinct groups, argues Buchanan, and only those groups whose 
predicament satisfies the conditions laid down in any of the several sound justifications for secession have this 
right. In effect, the right to secede is a special selective right that obtains only under certain conditions 
(Buchanan, 1991, pp.151-62). 
8 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, New Delhi: Viva Books, 2004, 
p.xv. 
9 Sumantra Bose is one of the few scholars on Kashmir who has tried to grapple with this specific issue by 
building the interests of other groups living in Kashmir into his solution for the problem (Kashmir: Roots of 
Conflict: Paths to Peace, Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 2003). 
10 Neera Chandhoke, Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious Minorities, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1999.  
 East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh on the ground that the Bengali-speaking 
community was discriminated against by West Pakistan.  
 
Secondly, we need to accept that partitions are seldom clean affairs: not only do they imprint 
bitter and un-erasable memories on the collective consciousness; they also leave legacies of 
unresolved boundary disputes and of other matters half done. India and Pakistan have on three 
occasions gone to war over disputed boundaries, and on other instances have come close to 
war. Or take Ethiopia and Eritrea, two of the poorest countries in the world. After a thirty-year 
war, Ethiopia recognised the independence of Eritrea in 1993. However, within five years war 
once again broke out between the two countries. Beginning as a minor border dispute, the 
war, which lasted from May 1998 to June 2000, resulted in an estimated 70,000-100,000 
deaths, cost each country $1 million a day,11 diverted funds from much needed development 
activities into military action and weapon procurement, and resulted in gross human rights 
violations. Thousands of Eritreans were forced to migrate and join the ever swelling ranks of 
refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa.12 All this took place in the midst of a severe drought that 
threatened to spiral into a famine as severe as the one that had afflicted the region in 1984. 
Five years after the Algiers Peace Accord of 2000, the border dispute remains unresolved.  
 
It is not surprising that liberal democrats, always uneasy with nationalism’s capacity to arouse 
primeval and belligerent emotions, are noticeably appalled when it comes to ethno-
nationalism.13 For ethno-nationalism has invariably been accompanied by violence, 
xenophobia, ethnic cleansing and genocide. After all, when a group tries to construct a nation 
in order to demand ‘a state of its own’, this invariably is at the cost of other groups who do not 
fit into narrow and exclusive constructions of nationhood. “Very many of the potential nations 
of this world”, wrote Ernest Gellner:  
live, or until recently have lived, not in compact territorial units but intermixed 
with each other in complex patterns. It follows that a territorial political unit can 
only become ethnically homogenous, in such cases, if it either kills, or expels, or 
assimilates all non-nationals.14  
For these reasons, democrats feel that the dark flanks of ethno-nationalism have to be 
contained in order to prevent another Croatia, another Serbia, another Rwanda, another 
Burundi, and another Sri Lanka. 
 
Consequently, scholars have worked hard and worked overtime to draft solutions to a rather 
intractable problem. If we were to sum up the proposals on offer they boil down to essentially 
two sets of recommendations: power sharing and protection of cultural rights.15 In effect, the 
only way to prevent secession is to practice the politics of redistribution and recognition of 
ethnic groups. Both these suggestions inevitably dilute, if not dissolve, images of homogenous 
and centralised nation states. More importantly, mechanisms of power sharing, regional 
autonomy, linguistic and religious rights, representation of group interests in decision-making 
bodies, and decentralisation will, it is hoped, reduce the intensity of separatist demands and 
neutralise challenges. Institutionalisation of power sharing may well reassure secessionist or 
potential secessionists that their interests will be represented and their vital concerns protected 
                                                
11 Mail and Guardian Online, at http://www.mg.co.za, 23 October 2004. 
12 See http://www.globalpolocy.org/security.issues.ethindex.ht. 
13 See, for instance, Chaim Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.   
14 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p.2. 
15 Wayne Norman, ‘Theorizing Nationalism (Normatively): The First Steps’, in Ronald Beiner (ed.), Theorising 
Nationalism, Albany: SUNY Press, 1999.  
 
 within the existing political community.16  Of course the danger is that monopoly over 
resources within the territory may also fuel separatist ambitions. But on balance, the federal 
argument is infinitely preferable to one that opposes federal arrangements. “Whereas 
decentralisation may provide cultural minorities with greater resources to engage in collective 
action”, writes Hechter, “at the same time it may erode the demand for sovereignty”.17  
 
Arguably, the idea that federalism and cultural rights may serve to resolve problems of 
separatism, presumes that the predicament was created in the first place by the centralisation 
of power and denial or suppression of cultural rights. Get rid of these distortions, suggest 
theorists, and you will have resolved the crisis. The problem is that the post-1988 armed 
conflict in Kashmir does not perfectly fit into the theoretical slot constituted by this genre of 
reasoning. For one, the Muslim community in Kashmir – sections of which lead militancy in 
the valley – was at least in theory granted control over power in the state. Secondly, the Indian 
Constitution specifically guarantees the educational and cultural rights of minorities through 
articles 29 and 30. Thirdly, the state has undergone the kind of economic and social 
transformation that the rest of the country has reason to envy, with a massive programme of 
land reforms ushering in an epoch of relative equality. For instance, poverty figures in the 
state are extremely low compared to Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa.18 In sum, central 
government policy towards J and K may have been mixed, often misguided, often arbitrary 
and unjust, at times overtly coercive, and at other times overtly accommodating. But to say 
that the inhabitants of the Kashmir valley have been subjected to outright repression or denial 
of cultural rights would be to misrepresent the issue. 
 
Yet from 1988 onwards, Kashmir has been wracked by brutal violence. Confrontation 
between militants and security forces has led to thousands of deaths, the imposition of 
draconian laws, and massive violations of civil liberties; and the cost ordinary people have 
had to pay for a conflict that is not of their making is stupendous. Consider that out of the 322 
respondents that our research team interviewed in the district of Srinagar, 45 percent of the 
respondents (55 percent in the HCAs and 34 percent in the LCAs) told us that the conflict had 
affected them personally. 26 percent told us that they were subjected to harassment by the 
security forces, and 21 percent said that they were suffering from psychological depression. 
The incidence of psychological depression in HCAs in Kashmir is 27 percent compared to 11 
percent in LCAs. That 34 percent of the respondents in LCAs suffer harassment at the hands 
of the security forces, compared to 21 percent in HCAs, is deeply suggestive of the fact that 
people who do not live in conflict areas are adversely affected by the fall out of the conflict.   
 
What was the cause for the outbreak of violence in Kashmir? The outbreak of conflict does 
not belong to the sphere of ‘happenstance’. Conflicts are produced and reproduced through 
political acts as much as they are resolved through political acts. In the rest of this paper I will 
argue that the reasons for the outbreak of militancy have to be looked for in the failure of 
political institutions and organisations in Kashmir, notably in the violation of the social 
contract, which set the ‘rules of the game’ in the first place. But fortunately contracts are not 
set in stone, and it is possible therefore to either renegotiate the social contract or to craft a 
new one that incorporates new demands and that rectifies shortcomings of the earlier one.19  
                                                
16 See Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic 
Conflict Regulation’, Journal of Peace Research, 39:2 (2001), pp.203-228. 
17 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.146. 
18 The number of people below the poverty line is only 3.48 percent (Planning Commission, State Development 
Report: Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi: Government of India, 2003, p.43). 
19 The argument is, of course, directly applicable to Kashmir, which is amidst conflict, but it can be generalised 
to other states. 
  
Just one point needs to be clarified here. I employ the generic concept of the ‘social contract’ 
to encompass both the democratic and the federal contract, for these are not two separate 
contracts. Federalism or decentralisation and devolution of power in a large, multilingual and 
multireligious society like India, is indispensable for the realisation of substantive democracy 
for two reasons. One, vertical and horizontal division of power between different organs of 
the government and different territorial units prevents concentration of power, because the 
latter is counterproductive for democratic life. Secondly, substantive democracy necessarily 
implies popular participation, and popular participation is both possible and effective in 
territorial units that are smaller than the nation state. In sum the realisation of democracy 
demands federalism and vice versa. 
 
 
The Social Contract 
Social contract theory has been subjected to a great deal of criticism, notably on the ground 
that history does not bear witness to the signing of the contract. These critiques, it seems to, 
me are misplaced for two reasons. Firstly, the social contract is not entirely fictitious, even if 
it is not entirely factual. What the notion of the social contract does is to provide us with a 
metaphor for the ordering of all manners of relationships in the modern world, marked as 
modernity is by the loss of moral obligation. “The choice” of the use of the social contract, 
writes two scholars: 
may be to create society; civil society; a sovereign; procedural rules of justice; or 
morality itself. The choice may be historical, ideal or hypothetical, its expression 
explicit or tacit, and the contractees may be each individual contracting with every 
other, individuals contracting with their rulers and God…the heads of families 
agreeing among themselves, corporations or cities contractually bound to a 
superior, or the people as a body contracting with a ruler or a king.20  
The contract, in other words, lays down procedures and establishes institutions to regulate 
relationships between individuals, between entities and individuals, and between entities. The 
establishment of procedural rules in turn engenders expectations that relationships will be 
ordered ‘this’ way and not ‘that’. Simply put the metaphorical signing of the contract begets 
hope that institutions will provide order, predictability and certainty to life itself. 
 
Secondly, the social contract is important because it signifies a transition from state x to state 
y, as for Thomas Hobbes for whom the social contract inaugurated a transition from the state 
of nature to political society. In the process, Hobbes significantly reversed the Aristotelian 
dictum that political society, or koinonia politike, is natural to human kind. For Hobbes 
political society is constructed for a specific end: to secure the basic right of human beings to 
self-preservation. This right is so important that the inhabitants of the state of nature are 
willing to surrender their natural freedom in return for assurances that their lives will be 
secured by the sovereign. The contract is thus a trade off between freedom granted by the law 
of nature and security provided by the state. But, if the Leviathan set up via the social contract 
violates the basic provisions of the contract, or if he fails to safeguard the right of self-
preservation in any manner, individuals have the right to dissolve the social contract and opt 
out of political society.21 Hobbes has generally been seen as a defender of the absolutist state, 
but it seems to me that he has given us the basic precepts of modern democratic thought: 
                                                
20 David Boucher & David Kelly, ‘The social contract and its critics: an overview’ in David Boucher & David 
Kelly (eds), The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, London: Routledge, 1994, p.2. 
21 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988 [1651]. 
 popular sovereignty, consent, the idea that individual rights pre-exist political society, 
political legitimacy and the limits of political obligation. 
 
Accordingly social contract theory is significant for democratic practices. Firstly, the social 
contract lays down the rules of the game inasmuch as it establishes both power and the limits 
of power, and political obligation and the limits of political obligation. Towards this end the 
contract institutes procedures and institutions, rules division of power between organisations, 
and provides for regulation of disagreements. Secondly, social contract theory tells us that 
government is a trust and that people delegate power to the state. For this very reason the state 
is compelled to respect the wishes of the people. If the state violates the terms of the contract 
in any way, citizens are no longer obliged to heed its diktats. They can vote it out of power, 
much as the Hobbesian individual can rebel if the Leviathan cannot provide him with the 
means of self-preservation. In sum, the social contract assures us that an activity that the 
Greeks called ‘politics’ is conducted in accordance with certain norms, that differences are 
contained /regulated / arbitrated / negotiated procedurally, and that no party can contravene 
these procedures/norms easily. The argument of the social contract, suggests Hampton, has 
been important in thinking through the idea of the government as the creation of the people, 
which they can and should judge, and which they have the right to overthrow if they find it 
wanting. Defenders of modern democracy, Hampton goes on to argue, self-consciously 
recognise one of the main descriptive points of the contractarians, namely that democratic 
societies are created and maintained by the people who are ruled by them.22  Two rather 
momentous implications follow: unless political aspirations are channelled and democratic 
accountability institutionalised, and unless state power is self-limiting, not only will politics 
spill out into the streets; it may well challenge the institutionalisation of politics itself.  
 
 
Historical Roots of the Social Contract in Jammu and Kashmir 
It is perhaps significant that the ‘signing’ of the social contract, which incorporated J and K 
into the Indian Union,23 was accompanied by acrimony and bitterness. In order to understand 
the complexities of the issue we need to briefly examine the political biography of J and K. 
Till 1947, J and K was a princely state that lay outside formal control of the colonial state. 
The state itself had come into existence in 1846, when the British East India Company, deeply 
unsettled by the factionalism which had pervaded Punjab in the aftermath of the death of 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the 1830s,24 and motivated by geo-strategic considerations, sold “all 
the hilly or mountainous country... eastward of the river Indus and westwards of the river 
Ravee… being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore state” to 
the Hindu/Dogra ruler of Jammu Gulab Singh, for a sum of Rs 7,500,000. Separate territories 
under different sovereignties were patched together to create the state of J and K: Jammu, the 
Kashmir valley, Ladakh and Baltistan (which had been occupied by Gulab Singh in the period 
1830-1840), and Gilghit (which was captured by him in 1860). In 1935, the British 
government formally leased the Gilghit agency, which had been under their de facto control, 
                                                
22 Jean Hampton, ‘Democracy and the rule of law’ in I. Shapiro & R. Barnett (eds), Nomos, New York: New 
York University Press, 1992. 
23 The Indian Union was forged through two separate and parallel processes. In the first instance, the immediate 
post-independence government fashioned constituent states of the federation out of the territory formerly known 
as British India on the twin principles of linguistic identity and territorial contiguity. In the second instance, 
hitherto autonomous princely states were incorporated into the Union through instruments of accession signed by 
the rulers. 
24 Kashmir was part of Ranjit Singh’s Sikh empire. 
 for a period of sixty years. In 1936, Poonch, formerly an independent kingdom, became a part 
of J and K.25  
 
“The underwriting of Dogra rule by the British”, writes Rai, “began a process that enabled the 
overlooking, if not the outright exclusion, of the elementary rights of the people of 
Kashmir”.26 From 1846 onwards, Dogra policy towards the Muslim inhabitants of the valley 
was based on religious discrimination, economic exploitation, heavy taxation, and denial of 
political rights. This not unexpectedly created massive discontent, which was tapped by 
Sheikh Abdullah in 1932 when he set up the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. 
The objective of the party was to protect the interests of the Muslim community against the 
tyrannies of the Maharaja. In 1939, the Muslim Conference was replaced with the secular and 
more inclusive Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC). Other non-Kashmiri Muslim 
leaders, such as Chowdhry Ghulam Abass, resurrected the Muslim Conference in the 
aftermath of the Pakistan Resolution of 1940, but it was the NC that was popularly seen as 
representing the interests of the people of the state. In the meanwhile, Sheikh Abdullah had 
allied with the Indian National Congress, which was at the forefront of the struggle for 
independence, and established close personal relations with Pandit Nehru in 1938.  
 
On 17 July 1947, the British government enacted the Indian Independence Act and set the 
stage for the transfer of power to India and the partition of the country. The Viceroy, Lord 
Mountbatten, advised rulers of all princely states to join either India or the new state of 
Pakistan. When it came to J and K, the Maharaja decided to keep his options open and 
proposed a ‘Standstill Agreement’ with both countries on 15 August,27 though he did consider 
the option of joining Pakistan if that would leave his powers and privileges intact.  On 15 
August, the British restored Gilghit Agency to J and K; and on 18 August, the Radcliffe 
Award on boundaries gave India a road link to the state through Gurdaspur in Punjab.  
 
There then began a period of tussle between India and Pakistan for control over J and K for a 
number of reasons. For one, since the frontiers of undivided J and K border China and 
Afghanistan, the region is geo-strategically significant for both the countries.28 Secondly, all 
the rivers upon which Pakistan is dependent for its water supply flow out of the state. Thirdly, 
the western flank of J and K borders Pakistani Punjab, and this, according to the Government 
of Pakistan, gave it rights to the territory. Fourthly, Pakistan claimed J and K because an 
overwhelming majority of the population in the valley was Muslim. On the other hand, for 
India the incorporation of J and K into the Union was crucial, because this would both 
                                                
25 The state, which is multilingual, multireligious and multicultural, consists of three regions each of which has 
distinctive characteristics. The region of Jammu is predominantly inhabited by Hindus, with Muslims being 
concentrated in the districts of Doda and Rajouri. Approximately half of the population of Ladakh, which is 
sparsely populated, is Buddhist, and the other half is composed of Shia Muslim and Hindus. In Pakistani-
Occupied Kashmir, Shia Muslims predominate in the Northern Areas of Hunza, Gilghit, Nagar, and Baltistan, 
and Sunnis in Kotli, Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad. Groups in that part of Kashmir are as culturally distinct 
from each other as in Indian Kashmir. 
26 Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, And the History of Kashmir, Delhi: Permanent 
Black, 2004, p.27. 
27 A standstill agreement vide the Government of India Act 1935 ensured the continuation of essential relations 
in communication, trade, and posts between a princely state that had not decided upon its options and one or both 
dominions. 
28 At the time of partition of India, J and K, including Aksai Chin, stretched over an area of 222,236 square 
kilometres; the valley constituted 10 percent of the total area, Jammu 14.4 percent, and the frontier districts as 
much as 75.6 percent. According to the 1941 census, Muslims formed 77 percent of the population and Hindus 
20 percent.  
 
 validate its declared policy of secularism and invalidate the two-nation theory, which had led 
to partition. 
 
Pakistan was well aware that the Maharaja would opt to join India if his wish for 
independence was thwarted. It was equally clear that Sheikh Abdullah, who became the head 
of the emergency administration in the state in September 1947, would opt for India, given the 
close links of his party with the Congress, his own personal links with Pandit Nehru, and the 
fact that NC had officially adopted secularism.29 Further, the Sikhs, the Hindus, and the 
Buddhists in Jammu and Ladakh would oppose accession to Pakistan. 
 
Internal developments in J and K provided Pakistan with the opportunity it was looking for to 
intervene in the state. In August 1947, the Muslim community of Poonch, provoked by the 
misrule of the Maharaja and by reports of massacres of Muslims in Hindu-dominated eastern 
Jammu districts during the partition,30 revolted under the leadership of demobilised soldiers.31 
By 3 October, the rebels, who had acquired control over much of the district of Poonch, along 
with the pro-Pakistani chieftains of Muzzafarabad and Mirpur in Western Jammu district, 
proclaimed the formation of ‘azad Kashmir’ in Pakistan. Shortly afterwards, on 18 November 
1947, Gilghit and neighbouring states, including Hunza and Nagar, signed Instruments of 
Accession with Pakistan.32  
 
On 21 October 1947, an armed incursion into the state by some several thousand Pashtun 
tribals from the North West Frontier Province took place. It was generally felt that Pakistan 
had backed the raid,33 though the Pakistani government insisted that it was not involved. After 
taking the town of Muzaffarabad, the raiders headed for Baramulla where they inflicted 
unimagined atrocities on the population. Killing almost 3,000 of the 14,000 population of the 
town, they subsequently moved towards Srinagar. The Maharaja, forced by circumstances to 
make up his mind on accession, signed the Instrument of Accession with India on 26 October 
1947, and sought military assistance to repel the invaders.34 The Instrument was accorded 
legality when Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General of India, accepted it the next day. But 
here occurs a twist in the tale that haunts politics in the Kashmir valley till today. In the letter 
that accompanied the acceptance of the Instrument of Accession, Lord Mountbatten stipulated 
that after the invasion was cleared and law and order restored, the question of the State’s 
accession should be settled by reference to the people. This was consistent, wrote 
Mountbatten, with the policy of the Government of India that in the case of any state where 
accession was disputed, accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the 
people. 
 
                                                
29 Zutshi quotes Sheik Abdullah as saying, in a public meeting after his release, that the question of accession 
would be decided in the best interests of the people of Kashmir. He is reported to have stated that “freedom 
before accession” was important for the people of the state (Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, 
Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003, p.306). 
30 On the other hand, the entire Hindu and Sikh population of Muslim majority districts in western Jammu 
districts (Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Rawalkot, Kotli, Mirpur and Bhimbar) were forced to migrate or killed.  
31 The revolt had begun earlier but was suppressed by the Maharaja’s soldiers.  
32 However, they have never been formally accepted as a part of Pakistan, and as part of the Northern Territories 
along with Baltistan, they remain under Pakistani administration without the same rights and privileges as the 
rest of the provinces in the country.  
33 The Maharaja of J and K, in a letter that accompanied the Instrument of Accession, stated that the “mass 
infiltration of tribesman…fully armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge 
of the Provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan” (cited in 
Vivek Chaddha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, Delhi: Sage, 2005, p.59).  
34 The Government of India had insisted that it could not send troops to an independent country. 
 Since the Maharaja had acceded to India, on 27 October 1947, Indian troops arrived in 
Srinagar in order to contain the onslaught of the tribal raiders. By 14 November, Baramullah 
and Uri had been recaptured by the Indian army. In the meanwhile, a meeting between Lord 
Mountbatten, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan in Lahore on 1 November to resolve the 
continuing tension caused by the tribal incursion came to naught, because the Pakistani 
government continued to insist that accession of the state of J and K to India was based on 
fraud and violence, and was therefore not bona fide.35 On 1 January 1948, India lodged a 
formal complaint against Pakistani aggression in the United Nations Security Council under 
article 35 of the UN Charter. Later that month, the UN set up a three member UN 
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to mediate the problem. 
 
Fighting resumed in April 1948 when Pakistan sent three brigades of regular troops into the 
valley. In April-May 1948, the Indian army retook Rajouri in Jammu, and moved north. The 
Security Council, under the heavy influence of the US and the UK, both of which were 
interested in protecting their strategic and economic interests in West Asia, adopted three 
resolutions in 1948 and 1949 calling for the withdrawal of Pakistani forces, reduction of the 
Indian presence in the state, and the appointment of a Commissioner who would oversee the 
holding of a plebiscite. The UN resolution adopted on 13 August 1948 recommended that a 
final decision on the status of J and K “shall be determined in accordance with the will of the 
people”. Thus not only was a bilateral problem internationalised, a rider was once again 
attached to the act of accession: the holding of a plebiscite. This was followed by a call for a 
ceasefire in August 1948 as an essential step for the holding of the plebiscite to determine the 
wishes of the people.  
 
The ceasefire finally came into effect on 1 January 1949.  In July 1949, the military 
representatives of the two countries signed the Karachi Agreement demarcating the ceasefire 
line, which stopped short at the Siachen Glacier, and both troops withdrew to behind the 
line.36 In effect the ceasefire formalised the tripartite division of J and K, with India keeping 
less than half of the undivided state, which is the major part of Jammu, Ladakh and the 
Kashmir valley.  One third of the region, which consists of a sliver of territory extending from 
the north to the south of western Jammu district, is under the control of Pakistan. Pakistan also 
controls Skardu in Ladakh, and the thinly populated Northern Territories of Gilghit and 
Baltistan. Aksai Chin, occupying 16.9 percent of the area of the state and almost no 
population, came under the control of China during the 1950s. In 1963, Pakistan ceded to 
China another 2.33 percent of the land claimed by India.37  
 
In March 1950, the UN wound up the UNCIP, and appointed a UN representative in India and 
Pakistan, and a Plebiscite Commissioner. However, the recommendations of the Plebiscite 
Commissioner did not find favour with the Prime Ministers of either country. In December 
1952, another UN resolution called for troop reduction by both countries. Whereas Pakistan 
                                                
35 Schofield (2004), p.61. 
36 Since 1949, the ceasefire line has remained the de facto border between the two parts of Kashmir on the one 
hand, and between India and Pakistan on the other. During the 1972 Simla negotiations between India and 
Pakistan, the ceasefire line was renamed the Line of Control (LOC). The LOC stopped short at the Siachen 
glacier, which extends for forty miles to the de facto border with China. In 1984, Indian troops took control of 
part of the glacier, and now Indian and Pakistani troops confront each other in the highest war zone in the world.  
37 Today 45.62 percent of the original territory of the state is with India, 35.15 percent with Pakistan, and 19.23 
percent with China. The valley of Kashmir consists of 15.8 percent of the area of Indian J and K, Jammu consists 
of 25.9 percent, and Ladakh 58.3 percent. According to the 2001 census, the population of Kashmir totals 10.01 
million, of which Muslims form 64.2 percent, Hindus 32.2 percent, and others 3.6 percent. Muslims form 95 
percent of the population in the valley.    
 accepted this, India did not. In the meanwhile India had tilted towards the Soviet Union, 
which had emerged as a formidable power in the UN even as Pakistan allied strategically with 
the US. The Soviet Union backed India’s position that the accession of J and K to India was 
not in dispute, and further discussions in the UN were deadlocked. Subsequently, though the 
Kashmir issue has been periodically raised in the UN, the problem has not been resolved. 
 
The promised plebiscite was never held, but Kashmir’s accession to the Indian Union was 
seen by India as settled for the following reasons. One, the Maharaja had signed the 
Instrument of Accession. Secondly, though Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the most popular 
political party in the state and the head of the state government since 1947, vacillated on the 
issue of whether J and K should opt for independence or join India or Pakistan, in 1948 he 
declared in the Security Council that “Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and 
constitutionally acceded to the dominion of India”.38 Thirdly, a few weeks after the Maharaja 
had acceded to India on 27 October 1947, the working committee of the NC passed a 
resolution recommending the accession of J and K to India, and the resolution was ratified by 
a special convention of the representatives of the people of the state. Throughout the war, 
from October 1947 to December 1948, the NC supported India. Fourthly, the State 
Constituent Assembly which was convened in October 1951, and to which delegates were 
elected on the basis of full adult franchise, approved accession. The Constitution of J and K, 
which was adopted in 1957, made the state an integral part of India. The then Prime Minister 
of the state, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, declared in the first broadcast he made to the nation 
that: “The democratic movement in the State has been consistently fighting for the realisation 
of an autonomous status for the State within the Indian Union”.39 Whereas accession was not 
disputed, the issue of autonomy of J and K was. Finally, though the Security Council had 
recommended that Pakistan withdraw its troops from the territory as a condition for holding 
the plebiscite, this was not carried out. In fact in 1948 India had accepted the recommendation 
of the UN Commission on India that a plebiscite be held in J and K, but Pakistan rejected the 
idea on the assumption that given the strong influence of Sheikh Abdullah the state would opt 
for India.  
 
Though in November 2004 President Musharraf of Pakistan dropped the demand for a 
plebiscite, this remains on the political agenda, albeit a contested political agenda. Schofield 
points out that in 1989, when the valley witnessed a popular uprising, some were still fighting 
for a plebiscite so that they could join Pakistan, and others wanted a plebiscite for the exercise 
of the third option: that of independence. Yet other inhabitants of the state (the Buddhists, the 
Ladakhis, and the Shia Muslims of the Kargil area) have not demanded the holding of a 
plebiscite and did not support the uprising.  The formerly nomadic Gujar and Bakherwal 
Muslims also did not support the uprising, and the Hindus and the Sikhs have in any case 
regarded J and K as an integral part of India.40   
 
Contractarians assume that the social contract is binding because parties consent to the terms 
voluntarily and in full awareness of what they are giving up and what they expect to receive in 
return. The problem is that contract theorists abstract the metaphorical ‘signing’ of the 
contract both from the messiness of political life and from histories and biographies. Consider, 
                                                
38 Cited in Riyaz Punjabi, ‘Kashmir imbroglio: the socio-political roots’, Contemporary South Asia, 4:1 (1995), 
p.47. However, as Punjabi notes, Sheikh Abdullah declared in a public meeting in September 1947 that “Our first 
demand is complete transfer of power to the people in Kashmir. Representatives of the people in a democratic 
Kashmir will then decide whether the state should join India or Pakistan” (Punjabi, 1995, p.46).   
39 Cited in Punjabi (1995), p.49. 
40 Schofield (2004), pg xiii. 
 for instance, how the Hobbesian state of nature is both pre-political and ahistorical. In the real 
world, however, matters cannot but be different, because the parties to the contract 
(individuals/groups and the state) are embedded in history as well as politics. In the case of 
Jammu and Kashmir, since the signing of the Instrument of Accession was accompanied by 
the commitment to hold a plebiscite in the state, the failure of the Indian government to hold 
the plebiscite for reasons detailed above, led to the feeling among some sections that the 
contract itself was not legitimate.  
 
Consequently, political grievances that had accumulated in and through the controversy that 
surrounded the ‘signing’ of the contract continue to stamp collective memories. The scars 
could have healed if the central government had respected the terms of the contract. Political 
passions could have been soothed and aroused popular energies could have been channelled 
through democratic processes. But since, as I seek to show below, the central government 
failed precisely on this account, historical memories of ‘harm done’ were to feed into the 
inventory of political grievances to create an explosive situation in the state within a rather 
short span of time. 
 
 
The Social Contract: Politicisation of Ethnicity and Violence 
It is generally agreed that the first generation of Indian leaders was remarkably prescient 
inasmuch as it recognised that the federal system had to be based on geography as well as 
identities. Today the idea that cultural groups should control power in their own spaces has 
taken hold of intellectual imaginations the world over. But in India the principle, which was 
accepted as far back as 1908, was institutionalised in 1956 through the formation of linguistic 
states. In J and K this assurance was given to the Muslim majority in the valley. For despite 
the fact that the state is both multireligious and multicultural, it is the Muslim majority in the 
valley that has, through a series of historical events detailed above, become politically 
significant. Further, the special status accorded to J and K should have assuaged any fears that 
the rights of the community would be infringed in any way.  
 
If this constituted the core of the federal contract between the centre and the states, the 
establishment of democracy in the country assured citizens that their interests would be 
protected. Most democrats agree that the best way to prevent discontent, which is arguably an 
intrinsic feature of mass politics, from spilling over into the streets is to channel it through 
institutions and procedures. Defenders of federalism concur that the best way of preventing 
discontent is to decentralise power to local elites. If division of powers between central and 
state governments provides the core safety valve in a federal system, political and civil rights, 
a functioning rule of law, and a free press constitute the hub of democratic practices. It is this 
understanding that is codified in the (federal/democratic) social contract. It follows that if the 
social contract is violated in any way by any entity, if the expectations generated by the social 
contract are frustrated, if governments and political parties and the institutions through which 
they operate fail to neutralise discontent, practitioners of politics may well feel that they are 
justified in taking up arms. It is precisely this that happened in J and K. 
 
In the late 1990s, the federal system in the country underwent a historic transformation 
because of the rise of regional parties and the establishment of coalition governments in the 
centre. In earlier times, however, the principle of state autonomy has been somewhat 
unhappily violated by the central government under the control of the Congress party and 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Even as the Congress attempted to monopolise and centralise 
power through a series of manoeuvres targeting non-Congress governments, the space of state 
 autonomy shrank drastically. This led to massive discontent in various parts of the country. 
But the consequences proved disastrous when it came to Kashmir, for the violation of the 
federal principle tended to be interpreted as a threat to the right of the dominant ethnic group 
to control power. In sum, the politicisation of ethnic identities that had taken place during the 
time that preceded the signing of the contract, added an extra dimension to centre-state 
relations. It is this extra dimension that has made conflicts within the state so inflexible. 
 
In effect, we can discern two sets of tensions at work in the federal system. The first set of 
tensions marked relationships between the central government and state governments with 
each struggling to expand its domain. The second set of tensions operated between political 
parties, which claimed to represent the interests of the community: the National Conference 
on the one hand, and political parties such as the Congress on the other. Often the two sets of 
leaders worked against each other, with one set invariably siding with the central leadership. 
Intra-elite competition for control of respective states often took ugly forms and resulted in 
factionalism and defections. This in turn led to the collapse of state governments, political 
instability, the imposition of presidential rule, and suspension of democratic life. 
 
The inability of state leaderships to safeguard state autonomy, and their collaboration with the 
central leadership in the making and the unmaking of governments, resulted in a third set of 
tensions erupting onto the political scene: between the central/state elites on the one hand, and 
‘new’ leaders who challenged the legitimacy of the former, often through the use of extra-
institutional methods. In J and K, these political leaders were forced to resort to the use of 
violence because they were denied opportunities to participate in the democratic process. 
 
If we were to map out the various dimensions of tension-ridden relationships between political 
actors, it might look something like this: 
 
 
C E N T R A L G O V T .
M IL ITANTS
P A R T Y  IN  
P O W E R
P A R T Y  
C O M P E TIN G  
F O R  P O W E RA C C O M O         D A T IO N
AC
CO
MO
DA
TI
ON
CO
NF
RO
NT
AT
IO
N
C O N F R O N              T A T IO N
ACCOMODATION
CONFRONTATION
C IV IL  S O C IE T Y
R
O
N
T
A
S T A T E      G O V T .
C
O
N
F
T
I
O
N
 
 
 
Given that the central government, the state government, and political parties vying for power 
failed to respect the respective mandates of the federal/democratic social contract, it is not 
surprising that citizens in the state, as our research shows, hold these three political entities 
responsible for the outbreak of violence. During the course of the survey, the research team 
 asked respondents who they thought were responsible for the outbreak of violence: political 
parties, the state government, the central government, security forces, external powers, 
separatist organisations, or other organisations. In Kashmir, a large percentage of 322 
respondents in both HCA and LCA held that three political entities (political parties, central 
government and state government) were responsible for the conflict in some way or the other 
(see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Fixing Responsibility 
 
 HCA LCA 
Political Parties 47.2% 62.0%
State Government 56.0% 74.0%
Central Government 44.0% 63.0%
External Powers 52.1% 57.4%
Security Forces 50.3% 59.0%
Militant Groups 32.0% 23.0%
 
 
The largest number of respondents in HCA and LCA in Kashmir feel that the state 
government is responsible. Given that the conflict continues, particularly in HCA in Kashmir, 
it is significant that after the state government, external powers, security forces and political 
parties in that order, are held more responsible for the problem than the central government. In 
the LCA, on the other hand, the state government, central government, political parties, and 
external powers are seen as more responsible than security forces for the problem. 
Substantially lower numbers of people in Kashmir hold the separatist groups responsible, 
though it is interesting that the percentage of people in HCA who think that separatist groups 
are responsible is higher than in the LCA. On balance, however, the three political entities 
(the central government, the state government, and political parties) are held responsible for 
the conflict in both the states in one way or another. 
 
When asked why these entities were responsible, the answers ranged from corruption in all 
three, failure to meet basic needs in the case of the state government, and failure to respect 
identity in the case of the central government; and when it came to the question of how far 
these three entities had helped to resolve the problem, the almost-majority opinion was that 
they have exploited the conflict for political and economic gains. The question that becomes 
significant in this context is: in what way did political institutions and organisations contribute 
to the conflict?  
 
Much of the anger in the Kashmir valley has been fuelled by two developments in state 
politics. One, that the terms on which the state was incorporated into the Indian Union have 
been massively violated by the central government in connivance with the state government. 
Secondly, whenever political groups other than those belonging to the dominant political party 
in the state (the National Conference) have tried to enter the democratic process, their efforts 
have been frustrated. This, as we shall see, has led different political groups, which before the 
1987 elections to the state legislative assembly were perfectly willing to participate in the 
democratic process, towards militancy. As far as the people of the valley are concerned, the 
state government (dominated till 2002 by the NC) and the central government controlled by 
the Congress party, are deeply compromised. All three entities have played their part in 
thwarting the aspirations of the people of the state, in preventing the expansion of the 
democratic space, proscribing the entry of new political groups into the political process, and 
in generally infringing the democratic rights of the people of the valley. If this has led to 
 militancy on the one hand, on the other it has led to deep disenchantment with the political 
process.  
 
As Koithara points out, the contest in Kashmir is not just between India and Pakistan, there is 
an important third party to the conflict: the large number of discontented people in the state. 
Though Pakistan has been trying to destabilise the region for long, Koithara goes on to argue, 
its efforts bore fruit only in the 1990s because of the intensification of frustration within the 
valley;41 and Widmalm suggests that the roots of political violence in J and K lie in the acts of 
the political elites and the weaknesses of institutions in the late 1980s. Resultantly, by 1988 
the political opposition in the state relinquished its faith in the usefulness of competing within 
what was left of the democratic framework.42  It is not that democracy and federalism were 
not established in J and K; it is that both these processes were not given a chance to be 
institutionalised. Even as the people of the state were denied access to governments and 
political parties that could channel popular aspirations and guide expressions of discontent 
into permissible forms, even as the federal contract was repeatedly flouted, even as opposition 
to policies in particular and to politics in general was interpreted as anti-national, and as 
threatening to the territorial integrity of the nation, protests took the form of extreme violence. 
It is not surprising that discontent was harnessed to the cause of Islamic jihad by Pakistani-
sponsored elements.43 What is surprising is that the Indian state failed to see that this would 
necessarily happen if democratic institutions degenerated. 
 
Consider, for instance, how the terms of the original contract were violated within a period of 
barely ten years. In May 1949, the leadership of the central government and that of the NC 
decided that the provisions of the Indian Constitution with regard to the powers of the central 
government vis a vis the state governments would not apply to J and K, and that the state 
would have a constitution of its own framed by a constituent assembly. This gave J and K a 
unique status as the only state that is governed by a constitution of its own. The accession of 
the state to the Indian Union was formalised vide the Indian Constitution, and the Constituent 
Assembly, honouring the 1949 settlement with the leadership of the NC, incorporated Article 
370, which laid down special provisions for the State. Accordingly the powers of the Indian 
Parliament to make laws for the state were limited to defence, external affairs, and 
communication. The government of J and K was not only granted complete jurisdiction over 
other areas in the state, but also given the right to have its own flag.44 More importantly, the 
provisions of the Indian Constitution could be extended to the state only with the concurrence 
of the state government and ratification by the constituent assembly. Article 370 was 
implemented by the first Constitution [Application to Jammu and Kashmir] Order in 1950. 
 
In October 1951, the J and K Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of adult 
franchise. On 24 August 1952, the Delhi Agreement, which was the product of negotiations 
between the central leadership and the leadership of the NC, stated that: 
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42 Sten Widmalm, ‘The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir’, in Amrita Basu & Atul Kohli (eds), 
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the Indian Union. 
 
  
• All powers other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession would remain 
with the state government; 
• The state government would regulate the rights of the permanent residents of J and K; 
• Though the provisions of the fundamental rights chapter of the Indian Constitution 
applied to the residents of J and K some exemptions were made particularly in regard 
to compensation for land reforms; 
• Hereditary rule was abolished; 
• Disputes between the centre and the states and between states would be arbitrated by 
the Supreme Court; 
• The jurisdiction of the Election Commission would extend in the case of J and K only 
to elections to parliament and elections of the President and the Vice President; 
• Whereas Article 352, which empowers the central government to declare a state of 
emergency, was applicable to J and K only in cases of external aggression, in cases of 
internal disturbances emergency provisions could be extended to the state only with 
the concurrence of the state government; 
• Article 356, according to which President’s rule can be imposed in the states, and 
Article 360, which gives the power to the central government to declare financial 
emergency, could not be extended to J and K. 
 
In 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was arrested because he, despite his own earlier defence of 
accession to India in the Security Council, had made public statements on independence for J 
and K. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed took over as ‘Prime Minister’ of Kashmir, a post that he 
occupied for ten years. The period was marked by the gradual, but insistent, erosion of the 
special status accorded to J and K. In 1957, the constituent assembly ceased to exist after 
having drafted a constitution for J and K that came into force on 26 January 1957, and after 
having formalised accession to India on 15 February 1954. Now the only barrier to the full 
integration of J and K into the Indian Union was the state government; a barrier that was 
removed by the compliant prime minister of J and K. The violation of the social contract 
began in earnest even as the jurisdiction of the central government was gradually extended to 
cover all subjects in the Union list. 
 
In 1958, the special provisions that governed the representation of the citizens of the state in 
the civil services were abolished, and the state ceased to be financially autonomous. In 1959 
and 1961, the permit system that governed the entry of non-citizens into the state was done 
away with, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Central Election Commission 
was extended to the state. In 1964, Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, which allows for the 
take-over of the state by the central government, was made applicable to J and K, and a Delhi-
appointed governor replaced the Sadar-i-Riyasat who was formerly appointed by the state 
legislative assembly. However, the governor of J and K continued to exercise the powers 
meant for the Sadar-i-Riyasat under Article 92 of the J and K Constitution, without the 
Governor being responsible to the legislative assembly.  
 
In sum, the social contract, which had allotted to J and K a great deal of autonomy, and which 
had limited the powers of the central government over the state, was dissolved by the central 
 government in connivance with the state leadership over a span of a decade and a half. The 
controversy that had dodged the signing of the original contract was intensified in the process.  
 
The situation was still manageable, for as Sheikh Abdullah wrote in his autobiography about 
the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah accord, which ensured his release from prison in 1975:  
I told my Indian friends that there is no difference of opinions as far as Kashmir’s 
accession to India is concerned. However, I have differences on the limits of 
accession. We had defined limits of accession through mutual agreements and it 
had resulted in the shape of Article 370 (of Indian Constitution guaranteeing the 
special status of Kashmir). The Indian leaders distorted this article forcibly and 
unconstitutionally, which separated us (from the Indian mainstream). If this 
situation is retrieved and the status quo ante is restored, our differences would be 
resolved.45  
But further events cancelled out such a resolution, because in 1985 the residuary powers of 
the state government were transferred to the central government. It is not surprising that all 
conversation in the valley on the origins of the conflict begin with complaints about the 
breach of the social contract. 
 
If the federal principle, and particularly the special status accorded to J and K, was insistently 
eroded by the central government, internal politics in the state were marked by two factors, 
both of which inhibited democracy in a major way. Firstly, the NC monopolised political 
power right up to 2002, often through massive electoral malpractices, denying thereby space 
to other political formations that could otherwise have become a part of the democratic 
process.46 Secondly, the NC entered into often amoral alliances with the Congress party in 
order to retain its hold on power, a fact that led to tremendous disillusionment particularly in 
the aftermath of the 1987 elections.47  That political groups were forced to resort to extra-
institutional means, particularly the use of violence, to press their point is not entirely 
unexpected. The findings of the research project – that the largest numbers of respondents in 
the Kashmir valley hold the state government and political parties above the central 
government responsible for the conflict – makes sense only in this context. 
 
Consider, for instance, the way in which the NC employed every means available to 
monopolise power. In 1953, Sheikh Abdullah, vacillating between defending accession to 
India, independence for J and K, the holding of a plebiscite in the state, and ensuring the 
greatest possible autonomy for the state, was arrested. He was released in 1958, only to be re-
imprisoned within three months. Subsequently he was in and out of prison until 1975. The 
1953 arrest catapulted Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed into the political domain as the Prime 
Minister of J and K, and he was responsible for allowing the central government to whittle 
down the autonomy granted to J and K. Under the leadership of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, 
the NC won a majority in the 1957 and 1962 elections. It also won the 1967 elections and 
1972 elections after it had merged with the Congress party in 1965. In January 1975, Sheikh 
Abdullah took over as Chief Minister with the support of the NC, which had merged into the 
Congress. In July, he resurrected the NC. The Sheikh, as the leader of the NC, came back to 
power in the June-July 1977 elections – generally hailed as the most free and fair elections 
ever held in the state. This was mainly because the Congress had been weakened with the 
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 dismissal of Indira Gandhi’s emergency regime in the 1977 general elections, and the Janata 
Party under Prime Minister Morarji Desai was in power at the centre.  
 
For the first time since 1947 democracy was given an opportunity to work in J and K. For ten 
years that state witnessed not only democratic practices but relative stability, calm and the 
absence of any kind of religious fundamentalism or violence. According to Widmalm 
Amanullah Khan, the head of the separatist group JKLF operating in ‘azad kashmir’ is 
reported to have said that even in 1983 conditions for launching a military campaign were not 
favourable. Widmalm concludes that when democracy was functioning in a relatively 
peaceful way in J and K, the demand to change the political status of the region was neither 
heard nor supported.48 
 
The tide turned in 1982, when Sheikh Abdullah died and the mantle of leadership of the NC 
fell onto the shoulders of his son, Farooq Abdullah. From here a period of deliberate 
subversion of democratic institutions and organisations, which despite five years of 
democratic rule were still weak, and the subversion of the democratic tradition, which was 
still fragile, began. The NC, already associated with large-scale corruption and nepotism, and 
wracked by factionalism, was to further add to its blemished record, when under Farooq’s 
leadership it entered into a series of sordid compromises with the Congress party. 
 
Prior to the 1983 state elections, the Congress, determined to capture the mandate in J and K, 
began to negotiate with the NC for an electoral alliance. Differences, however, cropped up 
over the Resettlement Bill,49 and the two parties were unable to resolve the issue of seat-
sharing. Consequently, the Congress and the NC contested the elections separately and the NC 
won 46 seats from the valley with Congress winning 26 seats from Jammu. Notably the two 
communal parties (the BJP and the Jamaat-i-Islami) did not secure any representation in the 
legislature. However, the elections, which saw an electoral turnout of 70 percent, were 
accompanied by widespread malpractices, an event that accelerated the erosion of the already 
insubstantial democratic spirit. 
 
Factionalism in the NC was used by the Congress party to destabilise the state government. In 
July 1984, the new Governor of the State, Jagmohan, dismissed the Farooq government on the 
charge that his party had lost a majority in the state following the defection of thirteen 
members of the government, of which twelve belonged to the NC. Farooq was ordered to step 
down without a vote of confidence in the assembly. The move expectedly aroused a storm of 
protest as one more proof of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s arbitrary treatment of non-
Congress governments. A new government, in which Shah was sworn in by the Governor as 
the Chief Minister, lasted only two years. In March 1986, the central government withdrew its 
support to Shah and imposed Governor’s rule. But six months before the Governor’s rule was 
to end, the central government reinstalled Farooq Abdullah as the Chief Minister. The re-
establishment of cordial relations between the Congress and Farooq Abdullah, who had barely 
two years earlier become a victim of the power play of the former, generated tremendous 
distrust of both the state government controlled by the NC and the central government 
controlled by the Congress. This was exacerbated when the two parties, blithely ignoring 
earlier differences, allied to fight the 1987 elections.  
 
The turn out in the election was as high as 75 percent, and the NC won in the valley and the 
Congress in Jammu, but communal organisations arrived onto the scene with the BJP securing 
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 two seats and with four of the eight independents belonging to the Muslim United Front. The 
1987 elections themselves were marked by coercion, electoral malpractices of a high order, 
and massive rigging.50 From here began the slide into violence that heralded the arrival of 
fundamentalist organisations in the valley. 
 
The near monopoly exercised by the NC over state politics, either as a part of the Congress or 
in alliance with the Congress, meant that independent political organisations had little chance 
of entering the arena of formal politics. This is not to say that independent political 
organisations did not exist. In 1963, the Awami Action Committee, led by Miwaiz 
Mohammed Farooq, and the Plebiscite Front, led by Mirza Afzal Beg, had become the focal 
points of political dissent. In 1964, the Kashmir Liberation Front was set up in Pakistan, 
which later became the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). In 1969, when Sheikh 
Abdullah announced that the Plebiscite Front would contest elections, he was expelled from 
the valley and the Front was declared unlawful. It was only in January 1973 that the ban on 
the Plebiscite Front was lifted.  
 
In 1987, only a few days after the alliance was forged between the Congress and the NC, a 
hitherto unknown organisation called the Muslim United Front (MUF), led by the Jamaat-e-
Islami under the leadership of Ali Shah Geelani and several other Islamic groups, called for a 
strike in the valley.51 Though the MUF secured four seats in the legislature, other leaders were 
prevented from doing so through rigging.52 For instance, the founder of the Peoples’ 
Conference in 1978, Abdul Ghani Lone, contested the 1987 elections from Handwara, where 
he confronted a NC candidate, Chowdry Muhammad Ramzan. The counting of votes was 
disrupted by the police, both Lone and his lawyer were prevented from observing the counting 
of votes, and Lone was declared to have lost the elections despite all evidence to the contrary. 
Subsequently Lone opted out of electoral politics. Representing the moderate voice of 
dissidence, Lone was assassinated in 2002. Bose suggests that electoral malpractices in the 
1987 elections were the reason why Yusuf Shah, who belonged to the Jamaat-i-Islami and 
who contested under the banner of the MUF, became Syed Salahuddin, the commander in 
chief of the dreaded Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the largest guerrilla force fighting the Government 
of India in the valley. For though he was reportedly winning the 1987 elections, his opponent 
who belonged to the NC was declared the winner. When Yusuf Shah protested, he was 
imprisoned along with Yassin Malik, his election officer. Upon his release, Yassin Malik 
joined the JKLF as a core member after having received training in arms in the Pakistani 
controlled parts of Kashmir.53 In summary, leaders who were denied a chance to participate in 
electoral democracy turned to militancy, simply because the democratic system was corrupted 
by two parties who were determined to hold onto power. 
 
The controversial 1987 elections proved the flashpoint in the turn to armed struggle. 
Reportedly thousands of young men crossed the border to undergo training in Pakistan. The 
NC and Congress passed the JK Special Powers Press Bill in the legislative assembly, which 
imposed complete censorship in the state. In 1988, widespread protests and violence rocked 
the valley, and three bombs exploded in Srinagar. MUF members quit the Legislative 
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 assembly and formed the extremist Hizbul-ul-Mujahadeen. Jagmohan, who was brought back 
as Governor, dismissed Farooq Abdullah’s government and imposed presidential rule, which 
led to protests, demonstrations, large scale arrests and police firing. In February 1988, the 
state assembly was dissolved. By 1990, violence had escalated and the army’s presence in the 
valley was reinforced with the extension of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the 
introduction of the Disturbed Areas Act. These Acts, along with the J and K Public Safety Act 
and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities [Prevention] Act, which were introduced in 1978 
and 1987, completely paralysed democratic life in the state. Even as moderate leaders 
belonging to the JKLF were arrested, the Hizbul-ul-Mujahadeen, which is backed by Pakistan, 
came to play a dominant role in militant politics. The JKLF launched a movement in 1990 
against the Indian government and to reunite the state with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir 
(POK). This received immense support. The scale of the popular uprising took everyone, 
including the JKLF, by surprise.  
 
As suggested above, in major part the uprising was propelled by the fact that democracy was 
not given a chance to be institutionalised in the valley. To this was added discontent over the 
political economy of the state. The latter is cause for some regret because the scale of 
economic and social transformation in the state finds little parallel in the rest of the country. 
As early as April 1948, Sheikh Abdullah, in keeping with the promises made in the manifesto 
‘Naya Kashmir’, which had been adopted by the NC in the 1940s, had launched upon the 
most ambitious land reform programme in the country. Land reforms transferred a total 
amount of 92,927 acres in 1951-52, 66,755 acres during 1952-53, and 36,619 acres during 
1953-54, to the tiller. Approximately 230,000 acres of cultivated land was transferred to 
200,000 tillers by the end of 1953, and about 800,000 acres up to 1961.54 Land reforms 
changed the structure of rural economy, and the pattern of land holdings was reversed from 
large landholdings to smaller ones. 70 percent of holdings are below the size of one hectare 
and big farms of five hectares and above constitute only 2 percent or less of total holdings. 
The average land holding in the region is only 0.9 hectare compared to 1.82 hectare in the rest 
of the country, and 46 percent of landholdings do not exceed half a hectare.55  
 
The increase in smallholdings created a greater sense of equality and social justice. However, 
the problem is that small landholdings are negatively correlated with productivity, unless land 
redistribution is accompanied by productivity improving measures such as irrigation, 
accessible finance and new technology. In J and K, 60 percent of the sown area is heavily 
dependent on rainwater for irrigation. Secondly, small landholdings did not benefit from 
modern techniques of production: tractors, chemical fertiliser, and plant protection measures. 
In sum, by the mid 1960s institutional change via land reform had failed to transform 
agriculture. Subsequently, however, in order to increase productivity, the state initiated 
various policy measures such as public finance, a public delivery system, responsive price 
mechanism, and a diversification of commodity markets. A strategy promoting an ‘Intensive 
Agricultural District Programme’ and a ‘High Yielding Varieties of Seeds programme’ was 
pursued from 1960 onwards. This was accompanied by the grant of major subsidies, which 
amounted in 1981 to Rs 260.3 million. A cooperative movement was established to accelerate 
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 the pace of growth by providing finance for crops, to facilitate marketing, and to raise the 
standard of living in the countryside. 
 
These strategies have achieved some positive results in the form of high yields of food, rice, 
maize and wheat, which are grown in 75 percent of the total cropped area in the state. 
However, cropping patterns, lack of irrigation due to power shortages, climatic difficulties, 
and the small size of landholdings in a context of still undeveloped infrastructure have 
resulted in a deficit of food grains. The state has to import grain, milk, mutton, cereals, 
vegetables and wool from neighbouring states. Moreover, Kashmir has a weak industrial base 
and it possesses no large-scale industries. Medium-scale industries operating under the public 
sector have performed poorly, as a result of which under-employment and unemployment 
have grown into severe problems. Verma has shown that areas of highest conflict in the valley 
(Anantnag, Baramulla, and Sophore) are precisely areas that suffer from high 
unemployment.56 
 
Conceivably, frustration over the lack of democratic opportunities was exacerbated by the 
lack of economic opportunities. These two factors combined to create a popular upsurge in the 
valley in 1990. By the early years of the 1990s, the movement subsided and gave way to 
extremist forms of politics, even as the spiral of popular discontent against denial of 
democratic rights was harnessed by pro-Pakistani militants, such as the Hizbul-ul-Mujahadeen 
and by Islamist jihadis.  Violence rapidly spread to the rural areas, leading to the large scale 
exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits. By 1993, thousands of militants, including those belonging to 
the Harkat-ul-Ansar, which is associated with the Afghan Mujhadeen, were operating in the 
valley.57 In the meanwhile, a number of former militant leaders formed the All Party Hurriyat 
Conference (APHC) in 1993, renounced violence and disassociated themselves from the 
militants. The APHC provides a moderate voice in the valley for independence with pro-
Pakistani groups being in a minority in the alliance. However, prone to factionalism and to 
splits, the APHC has not been able to make an impact on politics in the valley or displace 
existing political parties.58 In the meanwhile the valley continues to be torn by violence. Even 
as an elected government practices formal politics and the Hurrriyat shows itself willing to 
participate in formal politics, the militants practice extra-institutional politics. The Kashmir 
valley has had to pay a heavy price for the subversion of democratic norms and the 
undercutting of democratic institutions and organisations. 
     
 
Implications for Conflict Theories 
Conflict breeds its own trajectories and it becomes difficult to analyse with cool analytical 
precision why it erupted in the first place; and when it comes to ethno-national conflict, 
matters become even more complicated. Not only does ethno-nationalism appeal to complex 
emotions, such as the desire for shelter in a homeless world, and complain that the community 
that can provide such a home is itself in search of a safe haven, it also offers simplistic 
solutions for current predicaments: ‘a state of one’s own’. For these reasons, ethnic identities 
acquire a larger than life presence in any conflict and it becomes difficult to sort out which 
precise combination of factors led to the conflict in the first place. 
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 Perhaps the only way to do this is to see how ordinary people, especially those who live in 
high conflict zones, view the entire situation. Our research shows that despite the fact that 
identity politics is generally seen as the reason for militancy in the Kashmir valley, 59 percent 
of respondents in Kashmir feel that political state and central governments are responsible for 
the conflict. 30 percent of respondents said that political parties are responsible for the conflict 
because they do not raise issues of basic needs. But only 7 percent of respondents feel that 
political parties do not raise issues of identity.  
 
In response to a question of why the state government is held responsible for the conflict, the 
pattern of opinion toward state and central government is a little different. 44 percent of 
respondents in the valley feel that the state government is corrupt, 41 percent are of the 
opinion that the state government is responsible for the conflict because it does not resolve the 
issue of basic needs, and 7 percent opine that the state government is responsible because it 
does not raise issues of identity. As far as the central government is concerned, 16 percent of 
respondents said that the government is corrupt, 35 percent of respondents said that the central 
government is responsible for the conflict because it does not address issues of basic needs, 
and 27 percent feel that the central government does not address issues of identity.  
 
If we compare the responses of the inhabitants in the HCA and LCA in Kashmir, the figures 
are the following (Table 2): 
 
 
Table 2: Fixing Responsibility, Kashmir (%) 
  
Political Parties State Government Central Government  
HCA LCA Avg. HCA LCA Avg. HCA LCA Avg 
They are corrupt 52.6 64.6 58.6 42.4 44.7 43.6 18.9 12.0 15.5
Do not raise/resolve 
issues of basic 
needs 
34.2 25.3 29.8 43.5 37.7 40.6 35.1 35 35.1
Do not raise issues 
of identity 9.2 4.0 6.6 6.5 7.9 7.2 21.6 33 27.3
Some other reason 3.9 6.1 5.0 5.5 9.7 7.6 8.2 7.0 7.6
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.7
No response 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
 
In summary, an overwhelming percentage of respondents in Kashmir hold state and central 
government and political parties responsible for the conflict because of corruption and 
because of failure to negotiate basic needs. In comparison, the percentage of people who think 
that the failure of governments and parties to heed issues of identity led to the conflict are 
minuscule. These findings hold rather interesting implications for our understanding of the 
causes of political conflict. Perhaps the causes for ethnic violence have to be sought in 
violations of the social contract and in the failure of governments and parties to channel 
democratic practices. 
 
To return to the debate with which the argument in this paper began, federalism, democracy 
and minority rights are the best tools to deprive potential separatists of incentives to demand a 
state of their own. However, this prescription can only work if the rules of the game codified 
in the social contract are respected and if the expectations generated by the contract are not 
 belied. More important than formulas that seek to resolve conflict and violence, is respect for 
the basic precepts of the democratic and federal contract. Short of that, movements demanding 
statehood will inevitably spring up with large numbers of people feeling that it is more 
profitable to employ ‘terrorism’ to force recognition of the right to self-determination than to 
force one’s way into political spaces that have been closed to them.  
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